

## Computer Forensics: Too Much to Do Too Little Time!

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#### **Agenda**

- Cyber Attacks It's Already Too Late
- 2. Reacting to a Breach
- 3. Log Analysis
- 4. Event Investigation
- 5. Code Analysis
- 6. Objective and Subjective Risk
- 7. Hints and Tips



# Tails of the (Un)Expected



## **Cyber Attacks – The Expected Unexpected**





#### Cyber Attacks – Spilt Milk

Average breach cost

£2.4m

Attacks completed in minutes

60%

Attacks spread to second victim in one hour

40%

Time to detect a breach

191 Days

Time to contain a breach

66 Days

Average cost per record breached

£126

Annual cost of handling phishing £2.5m

Recipients opening phishing messages

60%

Recipients clicking phishing attachments

11%

Recipients clicking phishing links within 1 hour

50%

**Exploited** vulnerabilities older than 1 year

99.9%

New vulnerabilities exploited within 2 weeks

50%

Malware samples unique to target

70-90%

Organised crime attacks using crimeware

73%


Activist attacks targeting web applications

61%






#### No sector is safe




### Cost of a Data Breach – per record lost



Ponemon - 2017 Cost of Data Breach Study




#### **Attack Vectors are Evolving**





#### **Human Threats – Training May not be Enough**



#### **Broadened Attack Surface**



Mobile Devices



Data in Public Cloud



Cloud Infrastructure




**User Behavior** (For Example, Clicking Malicious Links in Email or Websites)




# Reacting to a Breach



### **Data Breach Mitigation – Before the Event**



## **Computer Security Incident Handling Protocols**



#### Timeline – day of incident, + day 1

#### Day of Breach

#### am:

- Customer services notified by customer of breach
- In-house compliance, legal and IT functions all notified
- IT takes immediate action to secure the data - note decision on forensics required\*
- Insurance

#### pm:

- Initial estimate suggests that data relating to over [X] data subjects/3rd parties were released
- In-house legal/compliance contacts external counsel
- Preliminary assessment begins

Day of Breach

**Breach Day** (BD) + 1

#### **BD** +1

- External legal advisers appointed
- External IT security specialists instructed
- External PR and Communications advisors instructed
- Core breach management team established\*
- IT team verify that all data has been removed from the public domain
- Immediate assessment of notification requirements
- Initial Notifications made to ICO (and potentially others



#### Timeline – first week

#### BD + 2 - 4BD + 7 PR plan formulated and draft statement prepared ICO acknowledges the company's self-reported • IT security specialists verify that all data is now secure and breach check all systems for ongoing security. A potential new third party Preliminary risk assessment completed service provider is identified and IT specialists perform due · Assessment made as to whether data subjects should be notified, and how to notify diligence **BD + 2** + 3 + 5 6 + 7 +8 BD + 5 - 6BD + 8• Source of the leak is notified, reservation of rights · Results of initial investigation are made available and confirm the total Team assesses how data subjects will be handled amount of data released and other (helplines; points of contact; assistance required - credit basic facts check services for example) ICO and other applicable regulators • Team prepare first draft notification letter to be sent to updated

affected data subjects. Insurer given notice and

opportunity to comment

Insurers updated

#### The Cyber Kill Chain – Complex Movements





# Log Analysis



#### **Event Timeline and Log Analysis**

## Computer Forensics relies heavily on log analysis:


- To help understand what occurred
- When did it happen?
- What systems have been impacted?
- Is the attack over?

## Preparation for a breach requires careful consideration

- The amount of logging data (how far back)
- How rich is the logging? (too much/too little)
- Notification Fatigue




### **Accelerated Log Analysis Tools**



## Analysis hardware speeds up security analytics 1000-10,000x



#### **Typical Risk Assessment Dashboard**




# Event Investigation




#### **Event Forensics – Analysis Platforms**

- Security intelligence platform for data breach investigations and forensic analysis
- Processing engine aggregates information from thousands of data types at superior speeds
- Data is analysed and correlated in four dimensions—people, objects, locations and events
- Lets you visualise critical relationships across a variety of file types with forensic precision





#### **Event Forensics – Analysis Platforms**




# Code Analysis



#### **Code Analysis**

- Static and **Dynamic Analysis**
- Petya Analysis
- Sandbox





### **Dynamic Analysis – Sandboxes / VMs**



770653

68%

274678

**Unique Domains** 

**Total Analyses** Shared Malware

Recent Analyses (see m	ore)
Aug. 10, 2017, 6:03 a.m.	e6297c17308c98acfc475916592368a3
Aug. 10, 2017, 6:02 a.m.	17bf398a6b4d951ffce1710ad665bb30
Aug. 10, 2017, 6:01 a.m.	594512b0f2eb19e0f61701a47dc92f82
Aug. 10, 2017, 6 a.m.	428af7fa03ff09ce1cd373abfebad8a3
Aug. 10, 2017, 6 a.m.	322774005cf4f429a7d60736ac6e2697
Aug. 10, 2017, 6 a.m.	84128b0a6bbf984a06312911cfb9c454
Aug. 10, 2017, 6 a.m.	7b81f03c84cefa56ef8519223d72bc2a
Aug. 10, 2017, 5:58 a.m.	0fd841cca0a98c3588e749de84787dbb
Aug 10 2017 5:56 a m	dfb5dd011a7a7a151154604b507016a0

Recent Domains	
www.bing.com	•
dev.null.vg	
scenetavern.win	
hallvilla.win	
download.cpuid.com	
www.piriform.com	
www.download.windowsupdate.com	
repnytimes.pw	
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#### **Dynamic Analysis – Sandboxes / VMs**

#### Signatures

File has been identified by at least one AntiVirus on VirusTotal as malicious


The binary likely contains encrypted or compressed data.

A process attempted to delay the analysis task by a long amount of time.

Installs itself for autorun at Windows startup

#### **Screenshots**






# Objective & Subjective Risk




#### **Risks are Not Hard to Find**




#### Threat Assessment: Pen Testing and Vulnerabilities






#### **Threat Assessment: Pen Testing and Vulnerabilities**



#### **Threat Assessment and Peer Rankings**



## Lessons Learned



#### **Tips for Continuous Cyber Health**

- Be Proactive!
- Failure to Detect the Attack
- Don't under-estimate the bad guys
- Over-reacting
- Public relations
- Waiting for Perfect Information
- Don't waste a good crisis!



# Q&A

